External Assets Evaluation

An Assets Evaluation is a more detailed development and analysis of information compiled during your Area Study; or it can be conducted independently. Here you classify and characterize persons, groups, enterprises, and agencies that are beyond your direct control, but might contribute to your security against a variety of threats.

Assets in this sense, whether individual or organizational, will have their own goals, duties, and responsibilities which may support yours in some ways and under some circumstances – but may be at cross-purposes in others.

The assistance they offer may include detection, notification, and intervention during an incident, or response in the aftermath. They may include prepared individuals, businesses, community organizations, private security contractors, emergency medical services, firefighters, law enforcement agencies, and other government agencies. In many cases, prior coordination and relationship-building could pay dividends in a crisis. You will have to determine where such overtures would be beneficial, and develop a strategy to establish lines of communication and shared understanding well in advance of any incident or crisis.

However, even at best these are not the same as "friendly forces" in the military METT-TC mission analysis model, nor are they "supporting" in the military doctrinal sense, because by definition they do not share your priorities or obligations and they are not part of your chain of command. They are either self-directed or respond to outside authorities. They are not direct threats either, although their actions might sometimes have a neutral or even a negative effect, which you must understand and be prepared for. They may engage threats in some fashion that furthers your interests, or they may provide vital support to your community or your property, for instance as first responders, or in the maintenance or restoration of services and infrastructure in a more protracted crisis.

Your Area Study should list all potential assets. Now you must assess each one critically and specifically, with regard to what they offer across the spectrum of scenarios you will be considering.

Historical case studies illustrate how the concept of external assets can be replete with hazards.

For an extreme example, consider the spontaneous response of citizens to the terrorist takeover of Beslan School #1 in the Russian republic of North Ossetia in 2004. While state security forces were slow to respond, armed civilians rapidly surrounded the school where hundreds of students, staff, and parents were being held hostage, murdered, and abused by the terrorists. The first-arriving Russian military and internal security forces established a perimeter and negotiated with the terrorists, but they were unable to establish any effective control or coordination with the growing mass of leaderless, undisciplined, outraged civilians. It appears that shots fired by unknown persons outside the school precipitated the hours-long final battle, forcing an emergency assault under unfavorable circumstances. Hostages died by the hundreds, and many authorities even believe that a significant number of the attackers escaped in the confusion. These civilians constituted a 'friendly' force whose goals coincided with the authorities but they were anything but an 'asset', as their undisciplined actions tipped an already high-risk situation into what may have been the worst possible outcome.

By contrast, during the Los Angeles riots in 1992, Korean-American merchants and families banded together to defend themselves and their property against rioters and looters. Ethnic bonds and community cohesion allowed these citizens to organize quickly and effectively, and they acted in an almost complete absence of law enforcement response or support. In the aftermath, several commented on this aspect of the situation. David Joo, manager of a local gun store, said, "I want to make it clear that we didn't open fire first. At that time, four police cars were there. Somebody started to shoot at us. The LAPD ran away in half a second. I never saw such a fast escape. I was pretty disappointed." Carl Rhyu, a participant in the Koreans' armed response to the rioting, said, "If it was your own business and your own property, would you be willing to trust it to someone else? We are glad the National Guard is here. They're good backup. But when our shops were burning we called the police every five minutes; no response." At a shopping center several miles north of Koreatown, Jay Rhee, who estimated that he and others fired five hundred shots into the ground and air, said, "We have lost our faith in the police. Where were you when we needed you?"

Another troubling example we are familiar with is an anecdotal story about a U.S. city in the mid-1980s, where private security contractors were brought from out of state to secure business premises from militant strikers. They found that the constituted authorities were NOT "friendly forces." The police department, sympathetic to the work stoppage, sought to arrest guards who exchanged blows with strikers attempting to rush the gates. Word on the street, which leaked inside the compound, was that the guards' lives would be at risk from other inmates, if they were taken into custody. The contractor smuggled the individuals out in supply vehicles, running a gauntlet of corrupt, pro-union law enforcement officers and enraged union thugs, to get them safely out of state.

Notwithstanding the preceding example, law enforcement officers are almost always assets in principle, because they represent the rule of law and civil order that we value. But their involvement can also create dangers to you and to themselves that you must plan carefully, and act judiciously, to avoid or mitigate.

Settled case law has established that law enforcement agencies and officers have no specific obligation to protect any individual or entity against violent crime, and even in the best of times they will seldom arrive in time to intervene effectively, as shown by the recent history of mass shootings in America. Police response in most urban and suburban areas averages between five and fifteen minutes, but most active shooter incidents are over in less time than that.

Law enforcement will almost always respond eventually, with a legal obligation to reestablish order, investigate, and apprehend suspects. When they do arrive at a chaotic ongoing or recently resolved incident, their natural tendency will be to interpret any armed individuals as threats, and despite all good intentions, there is significant risk to all parties in that moment.

For now, it is enough to recognize that "assets" will not necessarily or always behave like "friends." The risks and hazards are real; but support from external assets may be critical to your success. You must attempt to identify and characterize all assets with whom you believe you will interact; and recognize that differing scenarios and circumstances will affect their presence and responsiveness. For instance, regardless of their good will, in the event of a major natural disaster or widespread civil disorder law enforcement and emergency medical responders will be stretched thin, and you may be forced to rely on your own resources for an extended period of time.

Evaluation criteria for external assets

Proximity to your site, facility, or activity: can they observe, report, or intervene directly from their location – and under what conditions?

Capability: what you can reasonably expect them to contribute, for instance observation, reporting, evacuation, medical assistance, firefighting, investigation, apprehension of suspects or assailants?

Response time: under both normal and off-normal conditions

Potential for prior coordination: what can you do now to establish conditions favoring cooperation in a crisis? Is there potential for mutual support? Joint training? Integration of security plans, personnel, and capabilities? Prearranged communications and plans for linkup and interaction?

Homeland Security

One asset that is often overlooked, but present in almost every county in the United States is the Director of Homeland Security, an emergency management position supported by federal funding, successor to Cold War-era Civil Defense. These individuals and their staff are responsible for preparing and maintaining emergency response plans across multiple agencies for an area-specific set of possible crises. They operate Emergency Operations Centers, coordinate emergency management training and exercises, and, to varying degrees, coordinate response to actual emergencies. Staffing and funding are usually minimal, which makes them appreciative of any support and cooperation they receive. Many county HS offices maintain a volunteer support cadre called a Civilian Emergency Response Team (CERT). Volunteering for that team may be an excellent way to develop relationships with key assets in your area, learn about preparedness and response capabilities, and obtain useful emergency management training. Emergency response plans and the manning and capabilities of emergency operations centers are publicly accessible. Become familiar with them. Discover the local government agencies and employees who are responsible for emergency management and response coordination, and develop a relationship with them if you can.

Law enforcement and military

Law enforcement agencies, to the extent of their capabilities, will become involved in any violent incident, if not tactically, then at least in the aftermath. These may include federal, state, tribal, county, and municipal agencies, and in many areas mutual aid agreements will draw officers from neighboring jurisdictions; you will want to have a clear idea of the identity, capabilities, and relationships among all these agencies. If natural disasters, civil disorder, or acts of terrorism are included in your threat list, you should also be aware of military units (active, reserve, National Guard, and state guard or state defense force) in your area, and their strength, capabilities, and contingency plans.

It is important to identify all law enforcement and military organizations with jurisdiction and/or capabilities in your area, and your analysis should address the following factors:

• Chain of command and organizational structure
• Mutual aid and other supporting agreements across agencies
• Political control, loyalty, and effectiveness (e.g., the response of the Portland, Oregon police department to leftwing anarchist activities in that city 2018-2020)
• Functions, areas of responsibility and jurisdiction (for military, this includes statutes, regulations and authority for support of civil authorities)
• Crime rates and characteristics within the agency's jurisdiction
• Names and biographical sketches of key personnel
• Response to off-normal conditions (natural disaster, civil disorder, etc.), both planned and historical
• Identification system
• Potential restrictions on travel, gatherings, and curfews
• Personnel
• Reserves
• Strength
• Training
• Mobilization plans
• Ranks, uniforms, and insignia (would you recognize the uniforms of every agency that might respond to an incident at your location?)
• Arms and related equipment
• Investigative, surveillance, and crime-fighting equipment e.g., robotics and drones
• Traffic control equipment
• Riot control equipment and training
• Communications
• Transportation
• Average response time to your site(s), and how this might be affected by multiple or high-impact incidents elsewhere in their jurisdiction

Fire protection assets

Fire protection and response is another capability critical to your safety and security. Assess local capabilities and responsiveness:

• Organization (in general, the same as for law enforcement)
• Equipment: engines and their capacity, ladder trucks, rescue and extrication
• Type, location, and capacity of fire stations
• Adaptability and interoperability of local military or private firefighting equipment
• Personnel (manning levels, proficiency, and mode of selection)
• Training status and efficiency
• Names and reliability of key personnel
• Particular problems in certain areas, such as road net, access restrictions, water sources, redundant communications

Emergency medical services

EMS providers can be evaluated on similar bases, but also regarding:

• Level of care available at medical facilities
• Medical qualifications of ambulance personnel
• Availability of ambulances and air ambulance services
• Protocols governing response to active shooter and other security incidents (many EMS agencies will not enter a scene until it has been declared secure by LEA, which might be hours after the event when minutes determine life or death of injured persons)

Long term or large-scale crisis

If you are concerned about large scale or protracted crises (e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, volcanic events, major acts of terrorism or war), then resources and infrastructure capabilities provided by external individuals or organizations will probably be vital to your ability to sustain life and provide safety and security. Such events will heavily impact the capabilities of all categories of external assets already discussed. In addition, familiarize yourself, and coordinate as necessary, with individuals and organizations involved in supply and distribution of:

• Electrical power (grid and backup)
• Fuels (e.g., natural gas, propane, heating oil, diesel, and gasoline)
• Water (public water systems, well water, surface water, storage and distribution systems)
• Medical support, from routine but essential medications to trauma care
• Food

Finally, you must consider the presence of clients, passers-by, and other casual foot and/or vehicle traffic on or near your site or in your operating area, when an incident or crisis begins. What degree of responsibility will you accept for their welfare and safety? How will you interact with them? Will you - and how will you – provide shelter and necessary services? What can they contribute? Would they be assets or liabilities under various circumstances?

In summary

As the English poet John Donne said, "No man is an island, entire of itself…" and no individual, family, community or association is likely to thrive under conditions of hardship and threat without cooperation with neighbors and the public and civil organizations that we constitute. Self-reliance is a worthy goal, but will not always be enough. Know who is out there that can assist, and in turn benefit from your cooperation as well.