Most people know the popularized story of how the American Revolution – its kinetic phase, anyway – began on April, 19, 1775, when the Massachusetts militia turned out to oppose a British column marching from Boston to Concord to seize arms and military stores accumulated there by the colonists.

Myths have grown up around the events of that day, represented and encouraged by Ralph Waldo Emerson's poem, Concord Hymn, delivered at the dedication of a monument there on July 4, 1837:

By the rude bridge that arched the flood,

Their flag to April's breeze unfurled,

Here once the embattled farmers stood

And fired the shot heard round the world.

But the Massachusetts militia were not just "embattled farmers;" they were not a gaggle of gifted amateurs grabbing squirrel guns and "fowling pieces" from pegs over the door. They were members of an organized militia – 47 regiments of them in Massachusetts alone, with at least one company in every township.

By the mid-18th century, militia law of most colonies required that all free males between the ages of sixteen and fifty be enlisted. These men were organized into companies of thirty two to sixty eight men. Companies were organized into regiments and the Governor appointed the regimental officers. All militia in a county were under the direct command of a County Lieutenant holding the grade of colonel who, upon taking the field, outranked all colonels commanding individual regiments.

As the Revolutionary War neared, the colonies had fully organized military units ready at the calling. For example, Governor Trumbull of Connecticut reported in 1774 that he had 26,260 men and that each town had its own units that drilled four times a year. New Jersey reported 26 regiments of infantry and 11 troops of cavalry and Pennsylvania, in 1775, had 53 battalions of foot [https://www.revolutionarywarjournal.com/militias-in-colonial-america/]

Most of their elected officers and many of their enlisted members were combat veterans who had fought alongside British regulars in the French and Indian War of 1754-1763, or in the intermittent warfare of raids and reprisals fought with various native tribes since the earliest days of the colony. The average Massachusetts militiamen was in his mid-30s, more than a decade older – and more experienced – than the soldiers comprising British regular regiments.

While much warfare on the American continent was "irregular" in nature, only in myth were irregular or unconventional forces superior to the rigid linear tactics of professional European armies of the time. It was widely understood that those linear tactics were effective and necessary when confronting another disciplined force utilizing the same model. Companies and regiments of the colonial militia had fought alongside British regulars against French troops twenty years before, many of them under the same drill and discipline as regular troops – the only way to survive and win a stand-up fight.

Smoothbore, muzzle-loading flintlock muskets were the arm of choice in that era. Well-trained troops might sustain a rate of fire of 3-4 rounds per minute, but accuracy was terrible, and effective range was little over fifty yards even against area targets. To deliver effective fire required maneuvering tight, cohesive formations (typically companies of 50-60 men, three ranks deep, practically elbow to elbow, so that the orders of their officers and sergeants could heard) to less than 50 yards from the enemy. On arrival there, an exchange of volleys began that would end when one side either retreated into the cloud of powder smoke, or broke and incited either a bayonet charge by their opponents, or a charge by disciplined cavalry who could not, by themselves, break a tight formation of disciplined infantry.

A British infantry regiment consisted of ten companies, including one of grenadiers – heavy assault troops – and one of light infantry specialized in scouting and skirmishing. The light companies were typically as good at detached, irregular tactics as any of the colonials, and were often armed with rifles accurate at three to five times the range of the line companies' smoothbore muskets, although slower to reload.

Massachusetts militia regiments had their own elite: one or more companies of "Minute Men," select individuals who trained to deploy fully equipped at a moment's notice in answer to an alarm. Their origin predated the troubles with the British crown, and arose from the need to send "quick reaction teams" to the aid of neighboring townships under Indian attack.

The militia in action

Nor was April 19, 1775 the first time that British forces had confronted militia while marching through the Massachusetts countryside to confiscate colonial armaments.

On several other occasions in 1774 and early 1175, British columns marched from Boston to collect arms from the Massachusetts militia, arms increasingly seen as a threat, real or symbolic, to British rule. On several occasions, those columns were confronted at bridges or other choke points by local militia. In each case, those British columns – unlike the one that marched into Lexington on April 19 – were well-disciplined and led by officers who understood and obeyed their orders not to provoke a fight. The militia – sometimes only a few companies from nearby villages or towns, with no officer over the rank of captain – were also disciplined (or, we might say, well-regulated). Time and again the British columns stopped, ordered the militia to disperse, and when that did not happen, the British withdrew in good order rather than start a fight that they knew would incite a larger rebellion. The arms collected in these various expeditions were few and inconsequential. Hotheads did not prevail on either side.

This casts a new light on the words attributed to militia Captain John Parker on the Lexington Green April 19, 1775: "Stand your ground, men. Don't fire unless fired upon. But if they mean to have a war, let it begin here." Like most other Massachusetts militia officers, he knew of the other British forays, and expected this one to also turn back, or at worst, simply march on past the tiny contingent of Lexington militiamen who could not physically stop them, outnumbered 20:1 as they were.

However, the advance guard of the British column on that day was composed of the light companies of several regiments, men and officers who had not served together before, under the command of Major John Pitcairn of the Royal Marines, known as a reasonable man, but a stranger to most of the men under his command that day. It's still not known who fired the first shot, but British discipline and restraint failed, and their first volley shattered the peace. And, to make a long story short, gave us our nation.

The important lesson for us is that the militia in colonial America was neither an impromptu "pickup team" of farmers and tradesmen, nor were they private, self-organized bands of friends. They were an organized, trained armed force of mostly seasoned men, with regular, mandated training. They were led by officers at the company and regimental level who, like their troops, often had more combat experience than their peers serving as British regulars. And importantly, these militia units were subject to a chain of command that extended to the colonial governor.

Organized and Unorganized Militia

The U.S. Constitution, state constitutions, and both state and federal law refer to the "organized" versus the "unorganized" militia. These definitions are important. Organized militia were, from the earliest colonial period, like those described above: organized, regularly trained, commanded by officers commissioned by the state (or earlier, colonial) government and answerable to their governor. They could be called into Federal service, and often were, for over a century after our independence, to augment the small standing army of the United States.

In 1903, the state militias were organized into the National Guard, primarily to create a degree of standardization in leadership, training, and equipment that had been absent (and sorely missed) when they were called into federal service, most recently in the Spanish-American War of 1898.

In 1916, the National Guard was made subject to federal activation and overseas deployment for the duration of any war or national emergency, which had been the other drawback to the old militia system, where activation was brief and their deployment outside their home state was limited. In 1917-1918, the entire National Guard (that is to say, the militias of every state: over 300,000 men) were mobilized for World War I. In the midst of that mobilization in 1917, after outcry from many states, another federal law was passed which authorized the states to organize state militias that would not be subject to federal activation. This law is still in force.

More detail on this evolutionary process is provided in an earlier ST article. Our point here is that since 1917, state militias (variously called state guard, home guard, or state defense force) have been authorized in state and federal law. While state statutes differ, what they have in common is that these militias are commanded by the governor, receive no federal funding or regulation, and are not subject to federal activation like the National Guard. These state forces are, along with the National Guard, recognized as components of the organized militia.

There is no other organized militia in America. The unorganized militia is simply the pool of adult males who are subject to being called into military service by state or federal government and not already serving in the U.S. military, the National Guard, or an organized state militia. This is not well-understood, and would not be universally popular if it were; it defines an obligation and does not confer any special power or privileges on its members.

There is no middle ground. There are no legal provisions for privately organized militias, or even for county, city, or municipal militias. Many states, Wyoming included, have laws specifically prohibiting such so-called militias – laws that are a century or more old. Those laws are based on many historical instances, including the range wars of the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Wyoming and some other western states, where private armed groups were funded, raised, and sometimes employed against citizens or other armed groups, claiming Constitutional "militia" status despite the absence of any legal authority as such.

Private armed groups that call themselves militias, but are not part of the organized militia as defined in law, are illegal in Wyoming. Here is the statute that makes it so:

"W.S. 19-8-104. Other organizations parading with arms prohibited; penalty.

No group or assembly of persons other than the regularly organized national guard or the troops of the United States shall associate themselves together as a military company or organization, or parade in public with arms without license of the Governor. . ." [emphasis added]

The Wyoming State Guard – established in the state Constitution and Wyoming law, but existing only on paper at this time – would be the only "military company or organization" licensed by the Governor. Any others are in violation of state law.

To arms?

What are we waiting for? If we foresee a need for a military force at the state level that is not subject to open-ended mobilization into federal service, let's make it a "well-regulated militia," within the law, because if the rule of law collapses, we will be well behind the curve.

We should urge our legislators to amend and improve the existing law (W.S. 19-10-101) regarding the Wyoming State Guard; demand that the Governor exercise his authority to recruit, organize and train it; and volunteer as officers or enlisted members.

Other states have moved recently to revitalize their state militias, including Florida, Arizona, and most recently Montana with its LC-3919: Home Guard Revitalization Act in the 2023 legislative session, a bill that could be a useful template for action in Wyoming.

The traditional militia model – reaching back to pre-independence colonial days – would be companies recruited and trained to realistic standards at the local level, providing their own arms that meet established standards. They could support county sheriffs, other state or local agencies, and the National Guard (in its state role) through memorandums of agreement or understanding (MOA/MOU) authorized by the state chain of command, in roles that the state can define for itself. Should we wait for a crisis or get the ball rolling now?